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Jurisdiction 
This court has jurisdiction under Utah Code section 78A-3-102(3)(a). 
Statement of the Issues and Standards of Review 
In 1994, Lemuel Prion pleaded "guilty and mentally ill" to three felony charges. 
On September 1, 1994, the district court (i) sentenced Mr. Prion to serve concurrent terms 
of 5 years, 0 to 5 years, and 1 to 15 years, and (ii) ordered that Mr. Prion be committed to 
the Utah State Hospital for up to 18 months of treatment for his mental illness. (Add. A.) 
After nearly 8 months at the state hospital, Mr. Prion returned to the district court 
for resentencing under Utah Code section 77-16a-202(b).1 On March 15, 1995, the 
district court increased the sentence by ordering the three separate terms to run 
consecutively, not concurrently. (Add. B.) Under the original sentence, Mr. Prion would 
begin serving his 1 to 15 term immediately and his maximum sentence would be 15 
years. But under the second sentence, Mr. Prion would not begin serving his 1 to 15 year 
term until he had served his two 5-year terms, making his maximum term 25 years. 
Upon learning of the significant difference between the sentences, Mr. Prion filed 
a Rule 22(e) motion to vacate the second sentence on the ground that (i) the court lacked 
statutory authority to increase his sentence and (ii) the second sentence violates state and 
federal constitutional prohibitions on double jeopardy. The district court denied the 
motion. The court reasoned that because section 77-16a-202(l)(b) provides authority to 
resentence after treatment in the state hospital, the original sentence was not "final" for 
double jeopardy purposes. (Add. C.) 
1
 "[T]he court shall sentence the offender to a term of imprisonment and order that he be 
committed to the department for care and treatment for no more than 18 months, or until 
he has reached maximum benefit, whichever occurs first. At the expiration of that time, 
the court may recall the sentence and commitment, and resentence the offender." Utah 
Code Ann. § 77-16a-202(l)(b) (1994). 
In an unpublished per curiam decision, the court of appeals affirmed. The court 
did not analyze the statutory scheme for the "guilty and mentally ill," of which section 
77-16a-202(l)(b) is but a part, but held that Mr. Prion had no legitimate expectation of 
finality in the original sentence because (i) section 77-16a-202(l)(b) permits resentencing 
and (ii) the original sentencing order states that the court may amend the sentence. State 
v. Prion, 2009 UT App 219. (Add. D.) In essence, the court of appeals held that as long 
as a prisoner is told his sentence may be altered, jeopardy will never attach to a sentence. 
Issue 1: Whether Utah Code section 77-16a-202(b) permits district courts to 
increase a sentence after a prisoner has begun serving his sentence at the state hospital, 
where he receives mandatory treatment for his mental illness. 
Issue 2: Whether a district court's increasing a sentence under Utah Code section 
77-16a-202(b) after a prisoner has been treated in the state hospital violates prohibitions 
on double jeopardy, where the initial sentencing order is appealable as a final order and 
the prisoner's time in the state hospital is credited toward serving the sentence. 
Standard of Review: This court reviews a court of appeals' decision for 
correctness. State v. Billsie, 2006 UT 13, f 6, 131 P.3d 239. This court reviews 
interpretations of a statute for correctness. State v. Schofield, 2002 UT 132, ^ f 6, 63 P.3d 
667. And this court reviews the interpretation of constitutional provisions for 
correctness. Chen v. Stewart, 2004 UT 82,125, 100 P.3d 1177. 
Preservation: The first issue was preserved at GR. 54-55. The second issue was 
preserved at GR. 56-58. ("GR" refers to the green folder in the record.) 
Determinative Provisions 
All determinative provisions are at Addendum E. 
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Statement of the Case 
I. Nature of the Case 
This case presents the question of whether section 77-16a-202(l)(b) provides 
district courts the statutory authority to resentence a prisoner to a harsher sentence after 
the prisoner initially has been sentenced and committed for treatment to a state hospital, 
and, if so, whether constitutional prohibitions on double jeopardy prevent district courts 
from exercising their statutory discretion in such a manner. 
II. Course of Proceedings and Statement of Facts 
Because parts of the record have been destroyed and the district court has provided 
two folders using the same record numbers for different documents, Mr. Prion will refer 
to the record with "RR" for record cites in the red folder and "GR" for record cites in the 
green folder. Mr. Prion does not cite the separate envelopes or preliminary hearing 
transcript. 
In November of 1993, the State charged Mr. Prion with three third-degree felonies 
and two misdemeanors in case number 931800470. (GR. 12.) The felonies were 
aggravated assault (third-degree felony); distribution of a controlled substance (third-
degree felony); and failure to pay or affix a drug tax stamp (third-degree felony). 
(GR. 12.) The misdemeanors were escape from official custody (class B misdemeanor) 
and possession of drug paraphernalia (class B misdemeanor). (GR. 12.) 
"[T]he court shall sentence the offender to a term of imprisonment and order that he be 
committed to the department for care and treatment for no more than 18 months, or until 
he has reached maximum benefit, whichever occurs first. At the expiration of that time, 
the court may recall the sentence and commitment, and resentence the offender.5'1 Utah 
Code Ann. § 77-16a-202(l)(b) (1994). 
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While in jail, Mr. Prion attempted suicide by cutting himself. (GR. 9.) Based 
upon the attempted suicide, the State filed three additional felony charges, including 
felonies of the first, second, and third degrees in case number 941800068. (RR. 2.) The 
additional felonies were (i) possession of a weapon in a correctional facility (second-
degree felony); (ii) damage to jails (third-degree felony); and (iii) habitual criminal 
(first-degree felony). (RR. 2.) 
On August 24, 1994, Mr. Prion pleaded "guilty and mentally ill" to three of the 
charges in the two cases: (i) aggravated assault, (ii) dealer in possession without affixing 
a drug tax stamp, and (iii) possession of a dangerous weapon in a correctional facility. 
(RR. 50.) The remaining charges in each case were dismissed. (RR. 44.) 
At the time of sentencing, a doctor testified that, given the effects of Mr. Prion's 
medication, it would be inappropriate to place him with the Department of Corrections. 
(GR. 4.) The district court agreed. On September 1, 1994, the district court entered a 
"split sentence" under section 77-16a-202, sentencing Mr. Prion on the following terms: 
0 to 5 years for the aggravated assault conviction, 0 to 5 years for the drug tax conviction, 
and 1 to 15 years for the dangerous weapon conviction. (RR. 52-53.) Mr. Prion would 
begin serving his sentence by being remanded to the Utah State Hospital for up to 
18 months for treatment of his mental illness and then would serve his remaining 
sentence in prison. (RR. 52-53.) Importantly, the court ordered that the three prison 
terms run concurrently, so Mr. Prion's maximum sentence was 15 years. (RR. 52.) As 
soon as Mr. Prion entered the state hospital, he began serving his sentence. The time in 
the state hospital is credited against his sentence. Utah Code Ann. § 77-16a-202(4). 
4 
On March 14, 1995, after receiving 8 months of treatment in the state hospital, 
Mr. Prion was brought back before the district court for resentencing under section 
77-16a-202. (GR. 2.) During Mr. Prion's stay in the state hospital, he had received 
unfavorable reviews. (GR. 2.) Based on those reviews, the district court made additional 
findings of fact that Mr. Prion had potential for violent behavior and criminal conduct. 
(GR. 2.) The district court also found that Mr. Prion's "attitude [was] not conducive to 
supervision." (GR. 2.) Based upon these new findings of fact, the district court 
effectively increased Mr. Prion's sentence by ordering that his terms run consecutively 
rather than concurrently, which extended his maximum time to be served from 15 years 
to 25 years. (RR. 61-62.) 
Since his March 1995 resentencing, Mr. Prion has been detained at the Utah State 
Prison in Draper. (RR. 61.) He filed a motion to correct an illegal sentence under Rule 
22(e) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, arguing that the resentencing violated 
prohibitions on double jeopardy. (GR. 60-61.) On April 13, 2009, the district court 
denied his motion. (GR. 15-16.) On August 13, 2009, the court of appeals affirmed on a 
"sua sponte motion for summary disposition." Prion, 2009 UT App 219. In a 
4-paragraph per curium opinion, it held that Utah Code section 77-16a-202(b) 
contemplates a split sentence, and Mr. Prion therefore had no legitimate expectation of 
finality in his first sentence. Prion, 2009 UT App 219, ^ 4. 
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Summary of the Argument 
The district court exceeded its authority by increasing Mr. Prion's sentence under 
Utah Code section 77-16a-202 after Mr. Prion had served 8 months on his sentence in the 
state hospital. The district court also violated constitutional prohibitions on double 
jeopardy by increasing Mr. Prion's sentence. 
First, while section 77-16a-202 permits resentencing after treatment in the state 
hospital, it does not permit increasing the time to be served. Under section 77-16a-
104(3), once a district court determines that a defendant is mentally ill, the court (i) "shall 
impose any sentence that could be imposed under law upon a defendant who is not 
mentally ill" and (ii) commit him to the state hospital while serving his sentence. Thus, 
the original sentence does not reflect diminished culpability based upon mental illness; 
rather, the statute addresses the treatment of a "guilty and mentally ill" offender. Under 
section 77-16a-202, the prisoner receives "care and treatment" in the state hospital, but 
the hospital does not gather evidence concerning culpability. While the statute provides 
that the court may "resentence the offender," neither the legislative history nor the overall 
statutory scheme suggests that courts may increase the original sentence. Instead, 
resentencing presents an opportunity to determine whether (i) more time in the state 
hospital is needed, (ii) probation is now appropriate, or (iii) prison is warranted. 
Second, by increasing Mr. Prion's sentence, the district court violated double 
jeopardy principles. Because Mr. Prion had begun serving his original sentence and the 
order imposing that sentence was final for purposes of appeal, jeopardy attached and 
Mr. Prion had a reasonable expectation of the finality of his original sentence. This court 
should vacate the second sentence as violating prohibitions on double jeopardy. 
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Argument 
The district court both exceeded its statutory authority, and violated constitutional 
prohibitions on double jeopardy, when it increased Mr. Prion's sentence 8 months after 
Mr. Prion had begun serving his sentence in the state hospital. For both reasons this court 
should vacate the second sentence and reinstate Mr. Prion's original sentence. 
I. The District Court Misinterpreted the Statute as Granting It Authority to 
Increase Mr. Prion's Sentence 
Utah's law respecting the insanity defense is among the strictest in the nation. 
Daniel J. Nusbaum, The Craziest Reform of Them All: A Critical Analysis of the 
Constitutional Implications of "Abolishing" The Insanity Defense, Cornell L. Rev. 1509, 
1524 (2002) (Utah law "effectively precludes almost all insane defendants from 
exculpation on the basis of mental abnormality"). As a result, Utah treats a class of 
defendants as criminally culpable who would be ineligible for criminal sanctions in other 
jurisdictions. To deal with that class of defendants, the Legislature has enacted a detailed 
scheme of interlocking statutory provisions specifically for those who are "guilty and 
mentally ill." Utah Code Ann. § 77-16a-103 (1994). 
Both the district court and the court of appeals analyzed the resentencing authority 
granted to district courts under section 77-16a-202 without reference to the detailed 
statutory scheme of which section 77-16a-202 is but a part. Under the statutory scheme 
dealing with those who are "guilty and mentally ill," a district court may order a person 
found guilty and mentally ill to the state hospital for treatment before they are sent to 
prison, but may not, as the district court did here, increase a prisoner's sentence after the 
prisoner has been treated in the state hospital. 
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A. District Courts May Change the Location a Sentence Is Served in Light 
of Treatment, But May Not Increase a Sentence 
Under Utah law, if a defendant tenders a "guilty and mentally ill" plea, then the 
district court holds a hearing to determine whether the defendant is mentally ill. Id. at 
§ 77-16a-103(l).3 If the defendant is mentally ill, then the defendant is "sentenced in 
accordance with Section 77-16a-104." Id at § 77-16a-103(4).4 Here, Mr. Prion entered a 
plea of guilty and mentally ill, and the district court found Mr. Prion was mentally ill. 
In sentencing under section 77-16a-104, the district court first "shall impose any 
sentence that could be imposed under law upon a defendant who is not mentally ill" and 
then choose from three options: (i) commitment to the state hospital under section 77-
16a-202; (ii) probation under section 77-16a-201; or (iii) prison. Id at § 77-16a-104(3).5 
"Upon a plea of guilty and mentally ill being tendered by a defendant to any charge, the 
court shall hold a hearing within a reasonable time to determine whether the defendant is 
mentally ill." Utah Code Ann. § 77-16a-103(l) (1994). 
4
 "If the court concludes that the defendant is currently mentally ill his plea shall be 
accepted and he shall be sentenced in accordance with Section 77-16a-104." Utah Code 
Ann. §77-16a-103(4) (1994). 
5
 "If the court finds by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant is currently 
mentally ill, it shall impose any sentence that could be imposed under law upon a 
defendant who is not mentally ill and who is convicted of the same offense, and: 
(a) commit him to the department, in accordance with the provisions of Section 77-
16a-202, if it finds by clear and convincing evidence that: (i) because of his mental 
illness the defendant poses an immediate physical danger to self or others, 
including jeopardizing his own or others' safety, health, or welfare if placed in a 
correctional or probation setting, or lacks the ability to provide the basic necessities 
of life, such as food, clothing, and shelter, if placed on probation; and (ii) the 
department is able to provide the defendant with treatment, care, custody, and 
security that is adequate and appropriate to the defendant's conditions and needs. In 
order to insure that the requirements of this subsection are met, the court shall 
notify the executive director of the proposed placement and provide the department 
with an opportunity to evaluate the defendant and make a recommendation to the 
court regarding placement prior to commitment; 
(b) order probation in accordance with Section 77-16a-201; or 
(c) if the requirements of Subsections (a) and (b) are not met, place the defendant in 
the custody of UDC." 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-16a-104(3) (1994). 
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Here, the district court first sentenced Mr. Prion to serve concurrent terms of 5 years, 0 to 
5 years, and 1 to 15 years, and then chose the first option, i.e., commitment to the state 
hospital in accordance with section 77-16a-202. 
Section 77-16a-202(l) states that, after imposing a sentence, the district court may 
order commitment to the state hospital. Id. at § 77-16a-202(l).6 The district court has 
two options in its commitment order. Under 77-16a-202(l)(a), the court may commit the 
prisoner until the state hospital recommends transfer to the department of corrections, 
where the prisoner will serve his remaining sentence. Or under 77-16a-202(l)(b), the 
court can commit the prisoner to the hospital for no more than 18 months, after which 
period the court may resentence. Id Here, the district court chose the second option. 
While the prisoner is under the care of the state hospital, section 77-16a-203 
requires the state hospital to submit reports on the prisoner's status to the court every six 
months. Id at § 77-16a-202(3).7 Those reports describe "the offender's current mental 
6
 "In sentencing and committing a mentally ill offender to the department under 
Subsection 77-16a-104(3)(a), the court shall: 
(a) sentence the offender to a term of imprisonment and order that he be 
committed to the department for care and treatment until transferred to 
UDC in accordance with Sections 77-16a-203 and 77-16a-204; or 
(b) sentence the offender to a term of imprisonment and order that he be 
committed to the department for care and treatment for no more than 18 
months, or until he has reached maximum benefit, whichever occurs first. 
At the expiration of that time, the court may recall the sentence and 
commitment, and resentence the offender. A commitment and retention of 
jurisdiction under this subsection shall be specified in the sentencing order. 
If that specification is not included in the sentencing order, the offender 
shall be committed in accordance with Subsection (a)." 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-16a-202(l) (1994). 
7
 "When an offender is committed to the department under Subsection (l)(b), the 
department shall provide the court with reports of the offender's mental health status 
every six months. Those reports shall be prepared in accordance with the requirements of 
Section 77-16a-203. Additionally, the court may appoint an independent examiner to 
assess the mental health status of the offender." Utah Code Ann. § 77-16a-202(3) (1994). 
9 
condition, his progress since commitment, prognosis, and a recommendation regarding 
whether the mentally ill offender should be transferred to [the department of corrections] 
or remain [in the state hospital]." Id at § 77-16a-203(2).8 Notably, other than the 
potential for recidivism, the reports do not evaluate culpability in light of the mental 
illness.9 Instead, the state hospital determines whether the prisoner remains mentally ill 
and continues to be a danger to self or others, and, if so, whether that danger requires 
hospitalization, can be controlled while the prisoner is in the custody of the department of 
corrections, or warrants probation. Id, at § 77-16a-203(3).10 In other words, the state 
8
 "At the conclusion of its evaluation, the review team described in Subsection (1) shall 
make a report to the executive director regarding the offender's current mental condition, 
his progress since commitment, prognosis, and a recommendation regarding whether the 
mentally ill offender should be transferred to UDC or remain in the custody of the 
department." Utah Code Ann. § 77-16a-203(2) (1994). 
9
 The scope of the reports is confirmed by legislative history. Representative Lloyd 
Frandsen, the sponsor, described the bill as providing an administrative process aimed at 
"maximizing the treatment potential for mentally ill offenders." 1992 HB 418, House 
Floor Debate, Feb. 25, 1992, available at http:/www.le.state.ut.us/asp/audio/ 
index.asp?House^H. (Add. F.) Several agencies, including the Department of Human 
Services and the Department of Corrections, collaborated on the bill in an effort to 
address the needs of this unique class of convicted persons. IdL Representative Frandsen 
described the period of confinement as "treatment," which would be followed by a 
possible modification of the prisoner's sentence. Id. Neither the debate nor the House 
research file indicates that the treatment concerned assessing culpability for purpose of 
extending a prison term. 
10
 "(a) The executive director shall notify the UDC medical administrator, and the 
board's mental health adviser that a mentally ill offender is eligible for transfer to UDC if 
the review team finds that the offender: (i) is no longer mentally ill; or (ii) is still 
mentally ill and continues to be a danger to himself or others, but can be controlled if 
adequate care, medication, and treatment are provided, and that he has reached maximum 
benefit from the programs within the department. 
(b) The administrator of the mental health facility where the offender is located shall 
provide the UDC medical administrator with a copy of the reviewing staffs 
recommendation and: (i) all available clinical facts; (ii) the diagnosis; (iii) the course of 
treatment received at the mental health facility; (iv) the prognosis for remission of 
symptoms; (v) the potential for recidivism; (vi) an estimation of the offender's 
dangerousness, either to himself or others; and (vii) recommendations for future treatment." 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-16a-203(3) (1994). 
10 
hospital determines the best location for the convicted person to serve a sentence, not the 
length of that sentence. 
When the period of initial confinement in the state hospital has expired, the district 
court may "recall the sentence and commitment, and resentence the offender." Id. at 
§ 77-16a-202(l)(b). Based upon information provided by the state hospital, under 77-
16a-104(3) the district court may resentence the prisoner as follows: (i) "probation in 
accordance with Section 77-16a-201;" (ii) custody of the department of corrections; or 
(iii) recommitment to the state hospital in accordance with section 77-16a-202(l), which 
includes the option of commitment until such time as the state hospital determines prison 
would be appropriate. Id. at § 77-16a-104(3). 
If the mental illness has been mitigated (e.g., drugs), then probation may be 
appropriate. If the illness is not treatable, then transfer to prison may be appropriate. 
And if the prisoner could benefit from further treatment, then a longer stay in the state 
hospital may be appropriate. Here, the state hospital and the district court both concluded 
that Mr. Prion had received maximum benefit from the state hospital after 8 months. 
Instead of simply ordering that Mr. Prion serve the remainder of his sentence in 
prison, however, the district court made additional findings of fact concerning culpability 
and increased Mr. Prion's maximum sentence from 15 years to 25 years. Under the 
statute, the district court had no such authority, especially where the statute requires that 
the original sentence be one "that could be imposed under law upon a defendant who is 
not mentally ill." Id. at § 77-16a-104(3). The original sentence reflects criminal 
culpability, so the State may not impose further punishment. If the prisoner remains 
mentally ill and a danger to self or others after the service of a sentence, then the 
11 
administrator of the state hospital has the authority to initiate "civil proceedings of 
involuntary commitment." Utah Code Ann. § 77-16a-202(4). The district court cannot 
impose additional confinement, however, by increasing the previously imposed criminal 
sanction, which, again, was one "that could be imposed under law upon a defendant who 
is not mentally ill." Id. at § 77-16a-104(3). Therefore, when the district court here, in 
responding to the state hospital's assessment, changed Mr. Prion's original sentence in 
which his terms ran concurrently to a sentence in which those terms run consecutively, 
* the court exceeded its statutory authority. 
B. This Court Should Interpret the Statute to Avoid Violations of the 
Sixth Amendment 
To the extent it is unclear whether district courts have authority to increase 
punishment based upon additional factual findings after commitment to the state hospital, 
this court should reject that interpretation because it would construe the statute to violate 
both the Utah Constitution and the United States Constitution. When possible, courts 
should construe statutes to be consistent with constitutional provisions. State v. Briggs, 
2008 UT 83, Tf 47, 199 P.3d 935. Here, increasing a sentence based upon facts neither 
found by a jury nor admitted by the defendant violates both state and federal 
constitutional provisions. 
Under the Sixth Amendment, "[a]ny fact (other than a prior conviction) which is 
necessary to support a sentence exceeding the maximum authorized by the facts 
established by a plea of guilty or a jury verdict must be admitted by the defendant or 
proved by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt." United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 
244 (2005); see also Blakelv v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004); Apprendi v. New 
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Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000). Similarly, under the Utah Constitution all punishment-
enhancing facts must be established beyond a reasonable doubt either by a defendant's 
plea or by a jury trial. State v. Lopes, 1999 UT 24, ^ 22, 980 P.2d 191. Otherwise, a 
judge's independent fact finding for sentencing violates a defendant's due process and 
jury trial rights. IdL; see also State v. Briggs, 2008 UT 83, ^  47, 199 P.3d 935 (holding 
that defendant's procedural due process rights were violated because he did not have 
notice or an opportunity to contest his designation by the DOC as "currently dangerous"). 
By pleading guilty and mentally ill, Mr. Prion waived his right to a jury trial, but 
admitted only facts sufficient to establish the offenses and not those facts later found by 
the district court in resentencing based upon input from the state hospital. Based on the 
facts before the district court at Mr. Prion's original sentencing, the court gave him three 
concurrent sentences with a maximum of 15 years imprisonment. After Mr. Prion's 
hospitalization, the court found that Mr. Prion had potential for "violent behavior and 
criminal conduct" and increased the sentence terms to run consecutively to a maximum 
of 25 years. (GR. 2.) The court's increasing (i.e., enhancing) Mr. Prion's sentence based 
upon these facts violates state and federal constitutional provisions. 
Even though Mr. Prion did not raise these particular constitutional concerns as an 
independent ground for reversal, these concerns nonetheless may serve as an additional 
reason to adopt Mr. Prion's interpretation of the statute because the district court's 
interpretation, if adopted, would lead to constitutional concerns in the future. The 
statutory scheme, its legislative history, and looming constitutional concerns all suggest 
that this court should interpret section 77-16a-202(b) to preclude district courts from 
increasing sentences when resentencing after treatment in the state hospital. This court 
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should vacate the second sentence and reinstate the original sentence, which was 
grounded only on facts admitted by Mr. Prion. 
II. Mr. Prion's Second Sentence Violates Double Jeopardy Protections 
Assuming the district court had authority to increase Mr. Prion's sentence, the 
second sentence violates Mr. Prion's right to protection from double jeopardy. The 
Double Jeopardy Clause provides that no person shall be "twice put in jeopardy of life or 
limb." U.S. Const, amend. V; Utah Const, art. 1, § 12. "It is well established that the 
Double Jeopardy Clause protects a defendant against multiple punishments, as well as 
multiple prosecutions, for the same crime." State v. Maguire, 1999 UT App 45, f 7, 975 
P.2d 476; see also State v. One Hundred Seventy-Five Thousand Eight Hundred Dollars, 
942 P.2d 343, 349 (Utah 1997). By increasing Mr. Prion's sentence after he began 
serving that sentence, the district court violated prohibitions on double jeopardy. 
As explained in the following sections, Mr. Prion's resentencing violates double 
jeopardy protections because: (i) jeopardy attached to the original sentence; (ii) Mr. Prion 
had a legitimate expectation of finality in the original sentence; and (iii) the new sentence 
increases a cumulative maximum term of imprisonment. 
A. Jeopardy Attached to Mr. Prion's First Sentence 
The court of appeals held that jeopardy did not attach to the original sentence 
because Mr. Prion had no "legitimate expectation of finality in his original sentence." 
Sate v. Prion, 2009 UT App 219, Tf 3. The court of appeals' holding is based not only 
upon a misinterpretation of the statute as permitting an increased sentence after treatment 
at the state hospital, but also a mistaken view that Mr. Prion had no legitimate 
expectation that his original sentence was final for purposes of double jeopardy. Viewed 
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under the appropriate test for finality, the original sentence was final for purposes of 
double jeopardy. 
Once a sentence is reduced to writing, signed by the court, and entered, it becomes 
final. State v. Wright, 904 P.2d 1101, 1102 (Utah Ct. App. 1995). And once the 
defendant begins serving that sentence, the court cannot recall it and impose another 
punishment. Combs v. Turner, 483 P.2d 437, 401-02 (Utah 1971); North Carolina v. 
Pearce, 395 U.S. 711 (1969). In particular, a judge is powerless to increase a legal 
sentence after the prisoner has begun to serve it. United States v. Busic, 639 F.2d 940, 
946 (3d Cir. 1981). The "settled practice" is to allow resentencing and the imposition of 
a harsher sentence only prior to commencement of service. IdL at 948. 
"Commencement of service" includes court-ordered confinement in a mental 
hospital. Wade R. Habeeb, Annotation, Right to credit for time spent in custody prior to 
trial or sentence, 77 A.L.R.3d 182 (1977). Forced hospitalization is "the functional 
equivalent of jail" because the prisoner is confined against his or her will. Maniccia v. 
State, 931 So. 2d 1027 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006). As this court has recognized, "the 
confinement of a person in an institution for mental health treatment is just as effective a 
restraint on personal liberty as confinement in a prison and may, in some instances, be 
even more trying or burdensome. It is therefore essential that the rights of one so 
confined be treated with the same degree of respect as are the rights of persons deprived 
of their liberty upon accusation or conviction of criminal conduct." In re Wahlquist, 585 
P.2d 437, 439 (Utah 1978). Thus, time spent in a mental hospital counts as time spent in 
prison when determining credit for time served. Habeeb at § 16[b]. 
15 
Consistent with this position, under section 77-16a-202(4), once the time a 
prisoner has spent confined in the state hospital equals the maximum term reflected in the 
sentence imposed by the court, the prisoner can remain confined only pursuant to the 
separate civil commitment statutes.11 In addition, under section 77-16a-205, a prisoner 
can become eligible for, and be granted, parole while confined to the state hospital. 
These provisions demonstrate that jeopardy attached when Mr. Prion began his 
"commitment of service" in the state hospital. 
A sentence also is final for double jeopardy purposes when it is final for purposes 
of appeal and the time for the government to appeal the sentence has expired. As the 
Tenth Circuit has explained, while a criminal sentence is still appealable by the 
government the defendant can acquire no reasonable expectation of the finality of his 
original sentence. United States v. Jackson, 903 F.2d 1313, 1315 (10th Cir. 1990). 
However, once the time for appeal has expired, then an expectation of finality is 
reasonable. Id. Here, the State could have appealed Mr. Prion's original sentence for 30 
days after it was imposed, as this court has recognized similar "split" sentencing orders as 
final for purposes of appeal. State v. Herrera, 1999 UT 64, % 16, 993 P.2d 854. Once the 
State failed to appeal from Mr. Prion's original sentence, however, that sentence became 
final for purposes of appeal and, therefore, final for purposes of double jeopardy. 
Other jurisdictions also credit time confined in a mental hospital. People v. Cowsar, 
115 Cal. Rptr. 160 (Cal. Ct. App. 1974) (court must credit time spent in mental hospital); 
State v. La Badie, 534 P.2d 483, 485 (N.M. Ct. App. 1975) (same); People v. Pugh, 381 
N.Y.S.2d 417, 418-19 (1976) (crediting mentally ill prisoner with eight years served in a 
state hospital); Marsh v. Henderson, 424 S.W.2d 193, 196 (Tenn. 1968) (crediting 
prisoner for time spent in a state mental institution because "imprisonment" includes 
other "lawful place[s] of commitment and detention"). 
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The court of appeals erred in holding that jeopardy did not attach to the original 
sentence because Mr. Prion began serving his sentence and the time for the State to 
appeal that sentence expired. 
B. Mr. Prion Had a Legitimate Expectation of Finality in the Original 
Sentence 
Mr. Prion also had a legitimate expectation of finality in his original sentence. 
This is important because an illegitimate expectation of finality does not trigger double 
jeopardy protections. State v. Maguire, 1999 UT App 45, ^  8, 975 P.2d 476; see also 
Pasquarille v. United States, 130 F.3d 1220, 1222 (6th Cir. 1997). As the Tenth Circuit 
has explained, "there is no intrusion upon the values protected by the Fifth Amendment's 
double jeopardy clause by increasing the sentence of a criminal defendant if the 
defendant's expectation of the finality of the original sentence was illegitimate." United 
States v. Jackson, 903 F.2d 1313, 1315 (10th Cir. 1990). The circumstances under which 
an expectation of finality is illegitimate include (i) an illegal sentence; (ii) a prisoner's 
successful challenge to the conviction and sentence; and (iii) a sentence that undermines 
the objectives of the criminal statute. None of these circumstances are present here. 
First, defendant can acquire no legitimate expectation of finality if the sentence is 
illegal. United States v. Jackson, 903 F.2d 1313, 1316 (10th Cir. 1990). Here, 
Mr. Prion's original sentence was not illegal, as the district court merely ordered the 
indeterminate terms to run concurrently, something left to the discretion of district courts 
under Utah law. Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-401 (1994); Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-4 (1994). 
Therefore, the first exception to finality is not present. 
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Second, a prisoner cannot develop a "legitimate expectation of finality" where the 
prisoner disturbs the original sentence with a successful appeal. Where the original 
conviction is set aside, later resentencing may not violate principles of double jeopardy. 
As the United States Supreme Court has explained, the power to retry a defendant is the 
power, upon his reconviction, to impose whatever sentence may be authorized—even if it 
is an increase in the previously vacated punishment. North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 
711, 721 (1969). Utah likewise recognizes that a defendant does not have a legitimate 
expectation of finality where the defendant successfully challenges a conviction. State v. 
Maguire, 1999 UT App 45,13, 975 P.2d 476. But the rationale for this doctrine "rests 
ultimately upon the premise that the original conviction has, at the defendant's behest, 
been wholly nullified and the slate wiped clean." Pearce, 395 U.S. at 721 (emphasis 
added). Here, Mr. Prion did not appeal his sentence, let alone withdraw his guilty plea. 
Therefore, Mr. Prion did not, "by his own hand, defeat[] his expectation of finality" in his 
initial sentence. Maguire, 1999 UT App 45, f 11. 
Third, trial courts are permitted to revise sentences to achieve the objectives of the 
criminal statutes. Jones v. Thomas, 491 U.S. 376, 381 (1989) (quoting Missouri v. 
Hunter, 459 U.S. 359, 366 (1983)). For example, when a sentence is imposed based on 
multiple convictions on multiple crimes, and some of the convictions are then reversed, 
the court may revise sentences on the remaining counts to achieve the purpose of the 
criminal statutes. United States v. Busic, 639 F.2d 940 (3d Cir. 1981). Here, there is no 
question that Mr. Prion's original sentence with concurrently running sentences did not 
undermine the objectives of the criminal statutes at issue, especially since those statutes 
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specifically authorize concurrent sentences. Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-401 (1994). This 
should end the inquiry under the second exception to finality. 
The court of appeals arguably grounded its rather truncated analysis under this 
second "illegitimate expectation of finality" prong of double jeopardy law by stating that 
the Legislature defeated any legitimate expectation of finality by resentencing under 
section 77- 16a-202(b). Prion, 2009 UT App219, If 4. First, the court of appeals9 
reasoning rests upon a misinterpretation of the statute, as demonstrated above. Second, 
the relevant statutory objectives are the criminal statutes, not the "guilty and mentally ill" 
statutory scheme. Third, if the broader objectives of the "guilty and mentally ill" statute 
were relevant, rather than the statutes outlining the crimes to which Mr. Prion pleaded 
guilty, the court of appeals' analysis still fails. If a legislature could render double 
jeopardy principles inapplicable simply by declaring that a sentence can be increased at 
any time—which, according to the court of appeal, would thereby undermine any 
legitimate expectation to the contrary—then the legislature could nullify the 
constitutional protections afforded by the double jeopardy clauses with a statute merely 
stating that any sentence is subject to revision. This court should reject the court of 
appeals' flawed and superficial double jeopardy analysis. 
None of the three circumstances under which the law finds expectations of finality 
"illegitimate" is present here. Therefore, Mr. Prion's original sentence was final and 
jeopardy attached. 
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C. By Increasing Mr. Prion's Maximum Term of Imprisonment, the 
District Court Violated His Double Jeopardy Protections 
Because jeopardy attached, the district court violated prohibitions on double 
jeopardy when it increased his maximum term of imprisonment. "An increase in the 
prisoner's maximum term disturbs his legitimate expectation in the finality of his 
sentence, thus violating the protection against multiple punishments guaranteed by the 
double jeopardy clause." Stewart v. Scully, 925 F.2d 58, 58 (2d Cir. 1991). In Stewart, 
the Second Circuit held that a prisoner has "an expectation of finality with regard to his 
maximum term." Id. at 65. Therefore, the district court violated the prohibition on 
double jeopardy when it increased the maximum term, even though the court revised the 
sentence to comply with a requirement that the minimum sentence be a certain fraction of 
the minimum sentence. Id. In other words, while certain aspects of a sentence may be 
increased, the cumulative maximum sentence cannot exceed the original maximum term. 
In Utah, even where a conviction has been vacated, the district court lacks 
authority to impose a harsher sentence: "Where a conviction or sentence has been set 
aside on direct review or on collateral attack, the court shall not impose a new sentence 
for the same offense or for a different offense based on the same conduct which is more 
severe than the prior sentence less the portion of the prior sentence previously satisfied." 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-405 (1994). The primary objective of 76-3-405 is to protect a 
defendant's right to appeal by eliminating the chilling effect the threat of an increased 
sentence after a successful appeal might have on the exercise of appellate rights. State v. 
Samora, 2004 UT 79, f^ 15, 99 P. 3d 858. Similarly here, using any information gathered 
during a "guilty and mentally ill" prisoner's stay at the state hospital to increase that 
prisoner's punishment would chill the relationship between the prisoner and his 
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caretakers at the state hospital and would encourage the prisoner to be less than 
forthcoming with those trying to provide treatment for the mental illness. For example, a 
prisoner may be inclined not to reveal violent urges for fear that information will be used 
to increase his sentence later. This public policy concern not only supports Mr. Prion's 
interpretation of the statute, but bolsters his double jeopardy arguments. 
As a result of the change from concurrent terms to consecutive terms, Mr. Prion's 
maximum sentence was increased from 15 years to 25 years. He faces unavoidable 
adverse consequences as a result of the change in his sentence. For example, his initial 
parole hearing and first chance at release will be delayed by several years. The increase 
in Mr. Prion's maximum sentence therefore violates prohibitions on double jeopardy. 
Conclusion 
This court should vacate Mr. Prion's second sentence and reinstate the original 
sentence. The district court exceeded its statutory authority by increasing the original 
sentence under section 77-16a-202(b). And even if the district court had statutory 
authority to increase Mr. Prion's sentence, its exercise of that authority violated double 
jeopardy provisions in both the Utah Constitution and the United State Constitution. This 
court should reverse. 
DATED this 11th day of August, 2010. 
SNELL & WlLMER L.L.P. 
Michael D/2immerman 
Troy L. Booher 
Michael J. Thomas 
Attorneys for Petitioner Lemuel Prion 
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ROLAND URESK #3307 
Deputy Uintah County Attorney 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
152 East 100 North 
Vernal, Utah 84078 
(801) 781-5436 
IN THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
COUNTY OF UINTAH, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
P l a i n t i f f , : O R D E R 
vs. : 
LEMUEL PRION, : CASE NO. 931800470 FS 
941800068 FS 
Defendant. : 
This matter came on before the Court upon a hearing this the 
19th day of August, 1994, the Honorable John R. Anderson 
presiding. The State being represented by Roland Uresk, Deputy 
Uintah County Attorney. The Defendant being personally present 
and represented by Alan M. Williams. 
The Defendant having pled guilty and mentally ill to the 
charges of (1) Dangerous Weapon in Correctional Facility, a 
Second Degree Felony; (2) Aggravated Assault, a Third Degree 
Felony; (3) Dealer in Possession without Affixing Tax Stamp, a 
Third Degree Felony. 
The Court, having heard comments from both parties makes the 
following findings: 
COO 50 
1. That the Defendant poses an immediate physical 
danger to himself or others, including jeopardizing his own or 
others' safety, health, or welfare if placed in a correctional or 
probation setting, or lacks the ability to provide the basic 
necessities of life, such as food, clothing, and shelter, if 
placed on probation. 
2. That until the Defendant's medication is regulated 
he cannot be committed to the Department of Corrections. 
Based upon the foregoing the Court finds by clear and 
convincing evidence that the Defendant is currently mentally ill, 
therefore; 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED: 
1. That the Defendant is committed to the Department 
of Corrections for the following sentences: (a) Dangerous Weapon 
in Correctional Facility, a Second Degree Felony, not less than 
one (1) nor more than fifteen (15) years; (b) Aggravated Assault, 
a Third Degree Felony, not more than five (5) years; (c) Dealer 
in Possession without Affixing Tax Stamp, a Third Degree Felony, 
not more than five (5) years. Said sentences to run 
concurrently. 
2. That the Defendant is committed to the Department 
of Corrections for care and treatment for not more than eighteen 
(18) months, or until he has reached maximum benefit whichever 
2 
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occurs first. Upon this determination the Defendant shall be 
brought before this Court for reconsideration in his sentence. 
3. That the Department of Corrections shall file a 
progress report with the Court, the County Attorney and the 
Defendant's Attorney every six (6) months without fail. 
4. This Court retains jurisdiction in this matter to 
alter or amend its order. 
DATED this j $£ day of September, 1994. 
v&fMH VbAX* 
JOHN'*R. ANDERSON 
District Court Judge
 } 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING\HAND DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed, postage 
prepaid, or hand delivered a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing to Alan M. Williams, Attorney for Defendant, 365 West 
50 North #W10, Vernal, Utah 84078; Uintah County Jail, Vernal, 
Utah 84078. 
DATED this ) &• day of September, 1994. 
MM^U-
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EIGHTH DISTRICT COURT - VERNAL 
UINTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH JUDGMENT, SENTENCE 
VS (COMMITMENT) 
PRION, LEMUEL CASE NO: 941800068 
DOB: 04/27/62 
TAPE: COUNT: 
DATE: 08/24/94 
THE ABOVE NAMED DEFENDANT BEING ADJUDGED GUILTY FOR THE 
OFFENSE(S) AS FOLLOWS: 
Charge: 76-8-311.3(C) POSS WEAP IN CORRECTIONAL FACILITY 
Plea: Guilty Find: Guilty Plea 
Fine: 0.00 Susp: 0.00 
Jail: 0 Susp: 0 ACS: 0 
Charge: 76-8-418 INJ JAILS 
Plea: Find: Dismissed 
Fine: 0.00 Susp: 0.00. 
Jail: 0 Susp: 0 ACS: 0 
Charge: 76-8-1001 HABITUAL CRIM 
Plea: Find: Dismissed 
Fine: 0.00 Susp: 0.00 
Jail: 0 Susp: 0 ACS: 0 
GOB 3 D 
PRION, LEMUEL CASE NO: 941800068 PAGE 2 
DOCKET INFORMATION; 
Chrg: HABITUAL CRIM Plea: Find: Dismissed 
COURT FINDS BASED DOCTOR'S TESTIMONY ABOUT EFFECT OF MEDICINE, 
IT WOULD BE INAPPROPRIATE TO PLACE DEF WITH DEPT. OF CORRECTIONS 
RIGHT NOW. COURT FINDS DEF IS GUILTY BUT MENTALLY ILL, HAVING 
MET THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE STATE. COURT SENTENCES DEF TO TO 
1-15 YEARS AT UTAH STATE PRISON FOR DANGEROUS WEAPON IN 
CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTION, F2. COURT ORDERS DEF COMMITTED TO THE 
CARE OF DEPT. OF HUMAN SERVICES FOR NO MORE THAN 18 MONTHS. 
COURT ORDERS JURISDICTION BY THIS COURT BE SPECIFIC AND WILL 
REVIEW AND RESENTENCE DEF IN 18 MONTHS, OR SOONER. COURT WILL 
RECEIVE REPORTS OF DEF'S PROGRESS. 
DATED THIS ^7 DAY OF AUGUST, 1994. 
Sentence: ' 
Chrg: POSS WEAP-CORREC Plea: Guilty Find: Guilty Plea 
Prison: 1 to 15 YEARS Suspended: 0 
Chrg: INJ JAILS Plea: Find: Dismissed 
(Jr DISTRICT"COURT JUDGE/COMMISSIONER 
NOTE: APPEAL MUST BE FILED WITHIN 30 DAYS 
OF ENTRY OF THIS JUDGMENT. 
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KENNETH R. WALLENTINE #581? 
Chief Deputy Uintah County Attorney 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
152 East 100 North 
Vernal, Utah 84 078 
(801) 781-5435 
IN THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
COUNTY OF UINTAH, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
ORDER AND COMMITMENT 
vs. : 
LEMUEL PRION, : CASE NO. 941800068 FS 
Defendant. : 
THIS MATTER came before the Court for sentencing on the 14th 
» 
day of March, 1995. Defendant appeared with nis attorney, Alan M. 
Williams. The State was represented by Kenneth R. Wallentine, 
Chief Deputy Uintan County Attorney. Defendant having plead guilty 
to the aforementioned charges, the Court finds Defendant presents 
a serious threat of violent behavior, with repetitive instances of 
criminal conduct, and has an attitude not conducive to probation; 
therefore, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED: 
1. That Defendant be committed to the Utah State Prison for 
a term of not less than ONE (1) YEAR nor more than FIFTEEN (15) 
YEARS upon the offense of Dangerous Weapon in a Correctional 
Facility, a Second Degree Felony. Said sentence to be served 
consecutively with Case No. 941800470. Defendant is remanded to 
w j J j £f 
r>JS.THICT COURi 
Wk? IE 39:. 
S* »*«*••* «!>'., tiE-V. 
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the cusrody of rhe Uintah County Sheriff to be delivered by him to 
rhe Warden of rhe Utah Stare Prison. 
2* It is the Court's recommendation that the Defendant: 
continue on his prescribed medication. 
DATED t m s dav of March, 1995 
^yJuHN R.AND EPS ON 
District Court Judge 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING/HAND DELIVERY 
I hereby certify rhat I mailed, posrage prepaid, or hand 
delivered a true copy of rhe foregoing JuJgiue.it and Crier of 
Commitment to Alan K. Williams, Attorney for Defendant, 365 West 50 
North #W10, Vernal, UT 84 078; Department of Corrections, 152 East 
100 North, Vernal, Utah 84078; Uintah County Jail, Vernal, Utah 
84078. 
DA.TED this - ^? day of March, 1995. 
V ^ / J 
FILED 
DISTRICT COURT 
UINTAH COUNTY UTAH 
MAR 2 0 1995 
SHANA VWlfafcCK, CLERK 
EIGHTH DISTRICT COURT - VERNAL ^ Ll^__^ DEPUTY 
UINTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 0 
STATE OF UTAH JUDGMENT, SENTENCE 
VS (COMMITMENT) 
PRION, LEMUEL CASE NO: 941800068 
DOB: 04/27/62 
TAPE: COUNT: 
DATE: 03/14/95 
THE ABOVE NAMED DEFENDANT BEING ADJUDGED GUILTY FOR THE 
OFFENSE(S) AS FOLLOWS: 
Charge: 76-8-311.3(C) POSS WEAP IN CORRECTIONAL FACILITY 
Plea: Guilty Find: Guilty Plea 
Fine: 0.00 Susp: 0.00 
Jail: 0 Susp: 0 ACS: 0 
Charge: 76-8-418 INJ JAILS 
Plea: Find: Dismissed 
Fine: 0.00 Susp: 0.00 
Jail: 0 Susp: 0 ACS: 0 
Charge: 76-8-1001 HABITUAL CRIM 
Plea: Find: Dismissed 
Fine: 0.00 Susp: 0.00 
Jail: 0 Susp: 0 ACS: 0 
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DOCKET INFORMATION: 
Chrg: HABITUAL CRIM Plea: Find: Dismissed 
COURT FINDS BASED DOCTOR'S TESTIMONY ABOUT EFFECT OF MEDICINE, 
IT WOULD BE INAPPROPRIATE TO PLACE DEF WITH DEPT. OF CORRECTIONS 
RIGHT NOW. COURT FINDS DEF IS GUILTY BUT MENTALLY ILL, HAVING 
MET THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE STATE. COURT SENTENCES DEF TO TO 
1-15 YEARS AT UTAH STATE PRISON FOR DANGEROUS WEAPON IN 
CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTION, F2. COURT ORDERS DEF COMMITTED TO THE 
CARE OF DEPT. OF HUMAN SERVICES FOR NO MORE THAN 18 MONTHS. 
COURT ORDERS JURISDICTION BY THIS COURT BE SPECIFIC AND WILL 
REVIEW AND RESENTENCE DEF IN 18 MONTHS, OR SOONER. COURT WILL 
RECEIVE REPORTS OF DEF'S PROGRESS. 
DATED THIS DAY OF AUGUST, 1994. 
BY THE COURT: 
JOHN R. ANDERSON, DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
Sentence: 
Chrg: POSS WEAP-CORREC Plea: Guilty Find: Guilty Plea 
Prison: 1 to 15 YEARS Suspended: 0 
Chrg: INJ JAILS Plea: Find: Dismissed 
Sentence: 
Prison: 1 to 15 YEARS Suspended: 0 
THE COURT RESENTENCES DEF TO NOT LESS THAN 1 OR MORE THAN 15 
YEARS IN UTAH STATE PRISON FOR POSSESSION OF WEAPON IN 
CORRECTIONAL FACILITY, F2, IN THIS CASE; AND ALSO IN CASE 
941800470, THE COURT SENTENCES DEF TO TWO TERMS NOT TO EXCEED 
5 YEARS FOR AGG. ASLT, F3, AND FAILURE TO AFFIX DRUG TAX STAMP, 
F3. SENTENCES ARE TO RUN CONSECUTIVELY. DEF IS TO REMAIN ON 
MEDICATION, AND MEDICATION IS TO BE MONITORED. COURT WILL STAY 
EXECUTION OF SENTENCE UNTIL TUESDAY, MARCH 21, 1995, SO DEF 
CAN VISIT WITH MOTHER BEFORE HE IS REMANDED TO THE CUSTODY OF 
DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS. 
DATED THIS-/72 DAY OF MARCH, 1995. 
^DISTRICT COURT JUDGE/COMMISSIONER 
NOTE: APPEAL MUST BE FILED WITHIN 30 DAYS 
OF ENTRY OF THIS JUDGMENT. 
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COURTS %>n */, tyfc IN THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT T ^ ^ 
IN AND FOR UINTAH COUNTY, STATE OF U T A H \ / t 
State of Utah, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
Lemuel Prion, 
Defendant. 
RULING AND ORDER ON 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO 
CORRECT ILLEGAL SENTENCE 
Case No. 941800068 
Judge JOHN R. ANDERSON 
This matter is before the Court on the Defendant's Motion to Correct Illegal Sentence. 
Rule 22(e) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure allows a court to correct an illegal 
sentence at any time. 
On September 1, 1994, this Court found that the Defendant was mentally ill. The Court 
imposed sentences for the three crimes the Defendant committed and ordered the sentences to 
run concurrently. The Court ordered the Defendant to be committed to the Department of 
Corrections for care and treatment for no more than 18 months, or until the Defendant reached 
maximum benefit. The Court ordered that after that period of care and treatment, the Defendant 
would be brought before the Court for reconsideration of his sentence. 
On March 15, 1995, the Defendant was brought before the Court for sentencing. The 
Court imposed sentences for the three crimes the Defendant committed and ordered the sentences 
to run consecutively. 
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The Defendant argues that the sentence imposed was illegal because it violated his right 
to be free of double jeopardy. Specifically, the Defendant argues that when he was sentenced 
after the 18 month period in the State Hospital, he received a longer sentence. 
The Double Jeopardy Clause states "[n]or shall any person be subject for the same 
offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb " U.S. Const, amend V. "[T]he Double 
Jeopardy Clause protects defendants against multiple punishments, as well as multiple 
prosecutions, for the same crime." State v. Maguire, 975 P.2d 476,478 (Utah App. 1999). 
However, the Double Jeopardy Clause only protects against re-sentencing when the defendant 
reasonably believes the original sentence is final. Id. at 479. 
Utah Code Ann. §77-16a-202(b) allows a court to recall the sentence and commitment, 
and re-sentence the offender after the offender has been in the State Hospital for the specified 
period of time. Here, the Defendant had no reasonable expectation that the September 1, 1994, 
sentence was final because the Court specifically stated that the Defendant's sentence would be 
reconsidered after the 18 month period. Therefore, the Defendant's sentence did not violate the 
Double Jeopardy Clause and was not illegal. 
The Defendant's Motion to Correct Illegal Sentence is denied. 
Dated this l<> day of QjCVuJ 2009. 
JOHN R. ANDERSON, District Court Judge 
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UTAH APPELLATE COURTS 
AUG ! 3 2009 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
00O00--
State of Utah, 
Plaintiff and Appellee, 
v. 
Lemuel Prion, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
(Not For Official Publication) 
Case No. 20090380-CA 
F I L E D 
(August 13, 2009) 
2009 UT App 219 
Eighth District, Vernal Department, 931800470 
The Honorable John R. Anderson 
Attorneys: Lemuel Prion, Draper, Appellant Pro Se 
Mark L. Shurtleff and Kris C. Leonard, Salt Lake 
City, for Appellee 
Before Judges Greenwood, Bench, and Davis. 
PER CURIAM: 
Lemuel Prion appeals the district court's order denying his 
motion to correct an illegal sentence. This matter is before us 
on a sua sponte motion for summary disposition. We affirm. 
Utah Code section 77-l6a-202(b) permits the district court 
to sentence an offender to a term of imprisonment and order that 
the offender first be committed to the Department of Human 
Services for treatment until the offender's condition has been 
stabilized, but in no case shall the offender be committed for 
more than eighteen months. See Utah Code Ann. § 77-16a-202(b) 
(2008). At the expiration of an offender's treatment, "the court 
may recall the sentence and commitment, and resentence the 
offender." Id. A commitment and retention of the district 
court's jurisdiction under Utah Code section 77-16a-202(b) "shall 
be specified in the sentencing order." Id. 
Prion asserts that the district court violated his 
constitutional right to be free from double jeopardy when it 
recalled his sentence, pursuant to section 77-16a-202(b), and 
determined to run the sentences consecutively rather than 
concurrently. This court previously determined that the double 
jeopardy clause "only proscribes resentencing where the defendant 
has developed a legitimate expectation of the finality in his 
original sentence." State v. Maguire, 1999 UT App 45, ^ 8, 975 
P.2d 476. Thus, where there is no legitimate expectation of 
finality in the first proceeding, there can be no violation of 
double jeopardy protections. See id. 
As required by Utah Code section 77-16a-202(b), the 
September 1, 1994 order provided that the district court retained 
jurisdiction to alter or amend its originally contemplated 
sentence. See Utah Code Ann. § 77-16a-202(b). Additionally, the 
September 1, 1994 order expressly indicated that Prion's sentence 
would be reconsidered once he was released from his mental health 
treatment. Thus, we cannot say that Prion could legitimately 
expect that the September 1, 1994 order constituted his final 
sentence. Accordingly, the district court did not violate 
Prionfs constitutional right to be free from double jeopardy.1 
Affirmed. 
Pamela T. Greenwood, 
Presiding Judge 
Russell W. Bench, Judge 
1. Prion raises additional issues on appeal. We determine that 
those issues lack merit and do not address them. 
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TITLE 76. CRIMINAL CODE 
CHAPTER 3. PUNISHMENTS 
PART 4. LIMITATIONS AND SPECIAL PROVISIONS ON SENTENCES 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-405 (1994) 
§ 76-3-405. Limitation on sentence where conviction or prior sentence set aside 
Where a conviction or sentence has been set aside on direct review or on collateral attack, the court shall 
not impose a new sentence for the same offense or for a different offense based on the same conduct which is 
more severe than the prior sentence less the portion of the prior sentence previously satisfied. 
HISTORY: C. 1953, 76-3-405, enacted by L. 1973, ch. 196, § 76-3-405. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
In general. 
Appeal to district court from justice court. 
Attorney's misstatement of law to defendant. 
Finality of sentence. 
Purpose of section. 
Second sentence less severe. 
Second sentence more severe. 
Cited. 
IN GENERAL. 
This section's prohibition against a more severe second sentence requires that the second sentence cannot 
exceed the first sentence in appearance or effect, in the number of its elements or in their magnitude; there-
fore, concerning the second sentence, no new element of sentence can be added, no element can be aug-
mented in magnitude, and there can be no tradeoff by increasing one element of a sentence by reference to a 
decrease in another element. State v. Sorensen, 639 P.2d 179 (Utah 1981). 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-405 
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APPEAL TO DISTRICT COURT FROM JUSTICE COURT. 
At a trial de novo in district court on appeal from a conviction in a justice court, district court could not 
sentence defendant upon conviction to a more severe sentence than imposed by justice court. Wisden v. Dis-
trict Court, 694 P.2d 605 (Utah 1984), affd, 737 P.2d 981 (Utah 1987). 
ATTORNEY'S MISSTATEMENT OF LAW TO DEFENDANT. 
Defendant's allegation that he failed to appeal his conviction due to his attorney's advice that he stood a 
substantial chance of receiving a much harsher sentence upon a retrial, such advice being a misstatement of 
the law as provided by this section, entitled defendant to challenge his conviction by a petition for writ of 
habeas corpus where defendant also alleged that he was required to appear at trial in prison clothing, which 
allegation if true would constitute a violation of his constitutional due process rights. Chess v. Smith, 617 
P.2d 341 (Utah 1980). 
FINALITY OF SENTENCE. 
Concurrent sentences orally ordered by judge, but not signed in order to continue sentencing hearing for 
reconsideration of sentence, were not "set aside" on direct review or collateral attack within the meaning of 
this section. Therefore, the court's later imposition of consecutive sentences did not violate this section. State 
v. Curry, 814 P.2d 1150 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). 
PURPOSE OF SECTION. 
The purpose behind this section is to prevent the chilling effect on the constitutional right to appeal which 
the possibility of a harsher sentence would have on a defendant who might be able to demonstrate reversible 
error in his conviction. State v. Babbel, 813 P.2d 86 (Utah 1991), cert, denied, U.S. , 112 S. Ct. 883, 116 
L.Ed. 2d 787 (1992). 
This section was intended to protect the right of a criminal defendant to appeal, not to prevent the correc-
tion of a sentence unlawfully imposed. State v. Babbel, 813 P.2d 86 (Utah 1991), cert, denied, U.S. , 112 
S. Ct. 883, 116 L. Ed. 2d 787 (1992). 
The legislative intent behind this section is to protect an accused's constitutional right to appeal without 
having to face the possibility of a harsher sentence. State v. Mitchell, 824 P.2d 469 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). 
SECOND SENTENCE LESS SEVERE. 
Defendant's second sentence of one to fifteen years, plus one to five years and a $10,000 fine was less se-
vere when viewed in toto than his first sentence of life imprisonment. This was so even though the first sen-
tence did not include components analogous to aspects of the second sentence. State v. Mitchell, 824 P.2d 
469 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). 
SECOND SENTENCE MORE SEVERE. 
Defendant's second sentence, imposed after a successful appeal of his first conviction and a second convic-
tion on retrial, was more severe than the first sentence and was therefore prohibited by this section where 
following his first conviction, defendant was sentenced to 1 to 15 years in the penitentiary, but execution of 
that sentence was stayed and he was placed on two years' probation on the condition that he serve six months 
in the county jail and pay full restitution and, after his second conviction, defendant was sentenced to 1 to 15 
years in the penitentiary without requiring restitution, but with service of sentence to begin without delay. 
State v. Sorensen, 639 P.2d 179 (Utah 1981). 
CITED in Dunn v. Cook, 791 P.2d 873 (Utah 1990). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
A.L.R. —Propriety of increased punishment on new trial for same offense, 12 A.L.R.3d 978. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-405 
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KEY NUMBERS. -Criminal Law KEY 260(13). 
USER NOTE: For more generally applicable notes, see notes under the first section of this article, part, chap-
ter, subtitle, or title. 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-16a-101 
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TITLE 77. UTAH CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 
CHAPTER 16a. COMMITMENT AND TREATMENT OF MENTALLY ILL PERSONS 
PART 1. PLEA AND VERDICT OF GUILTY AND MENTALLY ILL 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-16a-101 (1994) 
§77-16a-101. Definitions 
As used in this chapter: 
(1) "Board" means the Board of Pardons and Parole established under Section 77-27-2. 
(2) "Department" means the Department of Human Services. 
(3) "Executive director" means the executive director of the Department of Human Services. 
(4) "Mental health facility" means the Utah State Hospital or other facility that provides mental health 
services under contract with the division, a local mental health authority, or organization that contracts with a 
local mental health authority. 
(5) "Mentally ill" means the same as that term is defined in Section 76-2-305. 
(6) "Mentally ill offender" means an individual who has been adjudicated guilty and mentally ill, in-
cluding an individual who is mentally retarded. 
(7) "Mentally retarded" means the same as the term "mental retardation", defined in Section 62A-5-
101. 
(8) "UDC" means the Department of Corrections. 
HISTORY: C. 1953, 77-16a-101, enacted by L. 1992, ch. 171, § 1; 1994, ch. 13, § 23. 
NOTES: AMENDMENT NOTES. -The 1994 amendment, effective May 2, 1994, substituted "Board of 
Pardons and Parole" for "Board of Pardons" in Subsection (1). 
COMPILER'S NOTES. -Rule 21.5, U.R.Crim.P., deals with pleas claiming mental illness or insanity. For 
notes from cases on that subject, see the Court Rules volume. 
EFFECTIVE DATES. -Laws 1992, ch. 171, § 18 makes the act effective on July 1, 1992. 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-16a-101 
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NOTES APPLICABLE TO ENTIRE TITLE 
REPEALS AND REENACTMENTS. -Title 77, Chapters 1 to 66, the Code of Criminal Procedure, was re-
pealed by Laws 1980, ch. 15, § 1, effective July 1, 1980, and present Utah Code of Criminal Procedure, 
Chapters 1 to 34, was enacted in its place by § 2 of the same act. Section 3 of Laws 1980, ch. 15 provided: 
"Nothing in this act shall be construed to repeal any particular section of Title 77, if that section is the subject 
of an amendment or new legislation enacted by this budget session of the 43 rd Utah legislature and which 
becomes law. It is the intent of the legislature that the corresponding sections of this act shall be construed 
with such amended sections so as to give effect to the amendment as if it were made a part of this act." 
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TITLE 77. UTAH CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 
CHAPTER 16a. COMMITMENT AND TREATMENT OF MENTALLY ILL PERSONS 
PART 1. PLEA AND VERDICT OF GUILTY AND MENTALLY ILL 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-16a-102 (1994) 
§ 77-16a-102. Jury instructions 
If a defendant asserts a defense of not guilty by reason of insanity, the court shall instruct the jury that it 
may find the defendant: 
(1) guilty; 
(2) not guilty; 
(3) not guilty by reason of insanity; 
(4) guilty and mentally ill; 
(5) guilty of a lesser offense; 
(6) guilty of a lesser offense and mentally ill; or 
(7) guilty of a lesser offense due to mental illness, but not a mental illness that warrants full exonera-
tion. 
HISTORY: C. 1953, 77-16a-102, enacted by L. 1992, ch. 171, § 2. 
NOTES: EFFECTIVE DATES. -Laws 1992, ch. 171, § 18 makes the act effective on July 1, 1992. 
USER NOTE: For more generally applicable notes, see notes under the first section of this article, part, chap-
ter, subtitle, or title. 
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TITLE 77. UTAH CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 
CHAPTER 16a. COMMITMENT AND TREATMENT OF MENTALLY ILL PERSONS 
PART 1. PLEA AND VERDICT OF GUILTY AND MENTALLY ILL 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-16a-103 (1994) 
§ 77-16a-103. Plea of guilty and mentally ill 
(1) Upon a plea of guilty and mentally ill being tendered by a defendant to any charge, the court shall hold 
a hearing within a reasonable time to determine whether the defendant is mentally ill. 
(2) The court may order the department to examine the defendant, and may receive the testimony of any 
public or private expert witness offered by the defendant or the prosecutor. The defendant may be placed in 
the Utah State Hospital for that examination only upon approval by the executive director. 
(3) (a) A defendant who tenders a plea of guilty and mentally ill shall be examined first by the trial 
judge, in compliance with the standards for taking pleas of guilty. The defendant shall be advised that a plea 
of guilty and mentally ill is a plea of guilty and not a contingent plea. 
(b) If the defendant is later found not to be mentally ill, that plea remains a valid plea of guilty, and the 
defendant shall be sentenced as any other offender. 
(4) If the court concludes that the defendant is currently mentally ill his plea shall be accepted and he 
shall be sentenced in accordance with Section 77-16a-104. 
(5) (a) When the offense is a state offense, expenses of examination, observation, and treatment for the 
defendant shall be paid by the department. 
(b) Travel expenses shall be paid by the county where prosecution is commenced. 
(c) Expenses of examination for defendants charged with violation of a municipal or county ordinance 
shall be paid by the municipality or county that commenced the prosecution. 
HISTORY: C. 1953, 77-16a-103, enacted by L. 1992, ch. 171, § 3. 
NOTES: EFFECTIVE DATES. -Laws 1992, ch. 171, § 18 makes the act effective on July 1, 1992. 
USER NOTE: For more generally applicable notes, see notes under the first section of this article, part, chap-
ter, subtitle, or title. 
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TITLE 77. UTAH CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 
CHAPTER 16a. COMMITMENT AND TREATMENT OF MENTALLY ILL PERSONS 
PART 1. PLEA AND VERDICT OF GUILTY AND MENTALLY ILL 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-16a-104 (1994) 
§ 77-16a-104. Verdict of guilty and mentally ill — Hearing to determine present mental state 
(1) Upon a verdict of guilty and mentally ill for the offense charged, or any lesser offense, the court shall 
conduct a hearing to determine the defendant's present mental state. 
(2) The court may order the department to examine the defendant to determine his mental condition, and 
may receive the evidence of any public or private expert witness offered by the defendant or the prosecutor. 
The defendant may be placed in the Utah State Hospital for that examination only upon approval of the ex-
ecutive director. 
(3) If the court finds by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant is currently mentally ill, it shall 
impose any sentence that could be imposed under law upon a defendant who is not mentally ill and who is 
convicted of the same offense, and: 
(a) commit him to the department, in accordance with the provisions of Section 77-16a-202, if it finds 
by clear and convincing evidence that: 
(i) because of his mental illness the defendant poses an immediate physical danger to self or others, 
including jeopardizing his own or others' safety, health, or welfare if placed in a correctional or probation 
setting, or lacks the ability to provide the basic necessities of life, such as food, clothing, and shelter, if 
placed on probation; and 
(ii) the department is able to provide the defendant with treatment, care, custody, and security that is 
adequate and appropriate to the defendant's conditions and needs. In order to insure that the requirements of 
this subsection are met, the court shall notify the executive director of the proposed placement and provide 
the department with an opportunity to evaluate the defendant and make a recommendation to the court re-
garding placement prior to commitment; 
(b) order probation in accordance with Section 77-16a-201; or 
(c) if the requirements of Subsections (a) and (b) are not met, place the defendant in the custody of 
UDC. 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-16a-104 
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(4) If the court finds that the defendant is not currently mentally ill, it shall sentence the defendant as it 
would any other defendant. 
(5) Expenses for examinations ordered under this section shall be paid in accordance with Subsection 76-
16a-103(5). 
HISTORY: C. 1953, 77-16a-104, enacted by L. 1992, ch. 171, § 4. 
NOTES: EFFECTIVE DATES. -Laws 1992, ch. 171, § 18 makes the act effective on July 1, 1992. 
USER NOTE: For more generally applicable notes, see notes under the first section of this article, part, chap-
ter, subtitle, or title. 
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TITLE 77. UTAH CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 
CHAPTER 16a. COMMITMENT AND TREATMENT OF MENTALLY ILL PERSONS 
PART 2. DISPOSITION OF DEFENDANTS FOUND GUILTY AND MENTALLY ILL 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-16a-201 (1994) 
§ 77-16a-201. Guilty and mentally ill — Probation 
(1) (a) When the court proposes to place on probation a defendant who has pled or is found guilty and men-
tally ill, it shall request UDC to provide a presentence investigation report regarding whether probation is 
appropriate for that defendant and, if so, recommending a specific treatment program. If the defendant is 
placed on probation, that treatment program shall be made a condition of probation, and the defendant shall 
remain under the jurisdiction of the sentencing court. 
(b) The court may not place a mentally ill offender who has been convicted of a capital offense on pro-
bation. 
(2) The period of probation may be for no less than five years, or until the expiration of the defendant's 
sentence, whichever occurs first. Probation may not be subsequently reduced by the sentencing court without 
consideration of an updated report on the mental health status of the defendant. i 
(3) (a) Treatment ordered by the court under this section may be provided by or under contract with the 
department, a mental health facility, a local mental health authority, or, with the approval of the sentencing 
court, any other public or private mental health provider. 
(b) The entity providing treatment under this section shall file a report with the defendant's probation 
officer at least every six months during the term of probation. 
(c) Any request for termination of probation regarding a defendant who is receiving treatment under 
this section shall include a current mental health report prepared by the treatment provider. 
(4) Failure to continue treatment or any other condition of probation, except by agreement with the entity 
providing treatment and the sentencing court, is a basis for initiating probation violation hearings. 
(5) The court may not release a mentally ill offender into the community, as a part of probation, if it finds 
by clear and convincing evidence that he: 
(a) poses an immediate physical danger to himself or others, including jeopardizing his own or others' 
safety, health, or welfare if released into the community; or 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-16a-201 
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(b) lacks the ability to provide the basic necessities of life, such as food, clothing, and shelter, if re-
leased into the community. 
(6) A mentally ill offender who is not eligible for release into the community under the provisions of 
Subsection (5) may be placed by the court, on probation, in an appropriate mental health facility. 
HISTORY: C. 1953, 77-16a-201, enacted by L. 1992, ch. 171, § 5. 
NOTES: EFFECTIVE DATES. -Laws 1992, ch. 171, § 18 makes the act effective on July 1, 1992. 
NOTES APPLICABLE TO ENTIRE TITLE 
REPEALS AND REENACTMENTS. -Title 77, Chapters 1 to 66, the Code of Criminal Procedure, was re-
pealed by Laws 1980, ch. 15, § 1, effective July 1, 1980, and present Utah Code of Criminal Procedure, 
Chapters 1 to 34, was enacted in its place by § 2 of the same act. Section 3 of Laws 1980, ch. 15 provided: 
"Nothing in this act shall be construed to repeal any particular section of Title 77, if that section is the subject 
of an amendment or new legislation enacted by this budget session of the 43rd Utah legislature and which 
becomes law. It is the intent of the legislature that the corresponding sections of this act shall be construed 
with such amended sections so as to give effect to the amendment as if it were made a part of this act." 
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TITLE 77. UTAH CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 
CHAPTER 16a. COMMITMENT AND TREATMENT OF MENTALLY ILL PERSONS 
PART 2. DISPOSITION OF DEFENDANTS FOUND GUILTY AND MENTALLY ILL 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-16a-202 (1994) 
§ 77-16a-202. Guilty and mentally ill — Commitment to department 
(1) In sentencing and committing a mentally ill offender to the department under Subsection 77-16a-
104(3)(a), the court shall: 
(a) sentence the offender to a term of imprisonment and order that he be committed to the department 
for care and treatment until transferred to UDC in accordance with Sections 77-16a-203 and 77-16a-204; or 
(b) sentence the offender to a term of imprisonment and order that he be committed to the department 
for care and treatment for no more than 18 months, or until he has reached maximum benefit, whichever oc-
curs first. At the expiration of that time, the court may recall the sentence and commitment, and resentence 
the offender. A commitment and retention of jurisdiction under this subsection shall be specified in the sen-
tencing order. If that specification is not included in the sentencing order, the offender shall be committed in 
accordance with Subsection (a). 
(2) The court may not retain jurisdiction, under Subsection (l)(b), over the sentence of a mentally ill of-
fender who has been convicted of a capital offense. In capital cases, the court shall make the findings re-
quired by this section after the capital sentencing proceeding mandated by Section 76-3-207. 
(3) When an offender is committed to the department under Subsection (l)(b), the department shall pro-
vide the court with reports of the offender's mental health status every six months. Those reports shall be 
prepared in accordance with the requirements of Section 77-16a-203. Additionally, the court may appoint an 
independent examiner to assess the mental health status of the offender. 
(4) The period of commitment may not exceed the maximum sentence imposed by the court. Upon expi-
ration of that sentence, the administrator of the facility where the offender is located may initiate civil pro-
ceedings for involuntary commitment in accordance with Title 62A, Chapter 12 or Title 62A, Chapter 5. 
HISTORY: C. 1953, 77-16a-202, enacted by L. 1992, ch. 171, § 6. 
NOTES: EFFECTIVE DATES. -Laws 1992, ch. 171, § 18 makes the act effective on July 1, 1992. 
USER NOTE: For more generally applicable notes, see notes under the first section of this article, part, chap-
ter, subtitle, or title. 
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TITLE 77. UTAH CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 
CHAPTER 16a. COMMITMENT AND TREATMENT OF MENTALLY ILL PERSONS 
PART 2. DISPOSITION OF DEFENDANTS FOUND GUILTY AND MENTALLY ELL 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-16a-203 (1994) 
§ 77-16a-203. Review of guilty and mentally ill persons committed to department - Recommendations for 
transfer 
(1) The executive director shall designate a review team of at least three qualified staff members, including 
at least one licensed psychiatrist, to evaluate the mental condition of each mentally ill offender committed to 
it in accordance with Section 77-16a-202, at least once every six months. If the offender is mentally retarded, 
the review team shall include at least one individual who is a designated mental retardation professional, as 
defined in Section 62A-5-301. 
(2) At the conclusion of its evaluation, the review team described in Subsection (1) shall make a report to 
the executive director regarding the offender's current mental condition, his progress since commitment, 
prognosis, and a recommendation regarding whether the mentally ill offender should be transferred to UDC 
or remain in the custody of the department. 
(3) (a) The executive director shall notify the UDC medical administrator, and the board's mental health 
adviser that a mentally ill offender is eligible for transfer to UDC if the review team finds that the offender: 
(i) is no longer mentally ill; or 
(ii) is still mentally ill and continues to be a danger to himself or others, but can be controlled if ade-
quate care, medication, and treatment are provided, and that he has reached maximum benefit from the pro-
grams within the department. 
(b) The administrator of the mental health facility where the offender is located shall provide the UDC 
medical administrator with a copy of the reviewing staffs recommendation and: 
(i) all available clinical facts; 
(ii) the diagnosis; 
(iii) the course of treatment received at the mental health facility; 
(iv) the prognosis for remission of symptoms; 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-16a-203 
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(v) the potential for recidivism; 
(vi) an estimation of the offender's dangerousness, either to himself or others; and 
(vii) recommendations for future treatment. 
HISTORY: C. 1953, 77-16a-203, enacted by L. 1992, ch. 171, § 7. 
NOTES: EFFECTIVE DATES. -Laws 1992, ch. 171, § 18 makes the act effective on July 1, 1992. 
USER NOTE: For more generally applicable notes, see notes under the first section of this article, part, chap-
ter, subtitle, or title. 
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TITLE 77. UTAH CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 
CHAPTER 16a. COMMITMENT AND TREATMENT OF MENTALLY ILL PERSONS 
PART 2. DISPOSITION OF DEFENDANTS FOUND GUILTY AND MENTALLY ILL 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-16a-204 (1994) 
§ 77-16a-204. Guilty and mentally ill — UDC acceptance of transfer 
(1) The UDC medical administrator shall designate a transfer team of at least three qualified staff members, 
including at least one licensed psychiatrist, to evaluate the recommendation made by the department's review 
team pursuant to Section 77-16a-203. If the offender is mentally retarded, the transfer team shall include at 
least one person who has expertise in testing and diagnosis of mentally retarded individuals. 
(2) The transfer team shall concur in the recommendation if it determines that UDC can provide the men-
tally ill offender with the level of care necessary to maintain his mental condition. 
(3) The UDC transfer team and medical administrator shall recommend the facility in which the offender 
should be placed and the treatment to be provided in order for his mental condition to remain stabilized to the 
director of the Division of Institutional Operations, within the Department of Corrections. 
(4) In the event that the department and UDC do not agree on the transfer of a mentally ill offender, the 
administrator of the mental health facility where the offender is located shall notify the mental health adviser 
for the board, in writing, of the dispute. The mental health adviser shall be provided with copies of all reports 
and recommendations. The board's mental health adviser shall make a recommendation to the board on the 
transfer and the board shall issue its decision within 30 days. 
(5) UDC shall notify the board whenever a mentally ill offender is transferred from the department to 
UDC. 
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§ 77-16a-205. Guilty and mentally ill -- Parole 
(1) When a mentally ill offender who has been committed to the department becomes eligible to be consid-
ered for parole, the board shall request a recommendation from the executive director and from UDC before 
placing the offender on parole. 
(2) Before setting a parole date, the board shall request that its mental health adviser prepare a report re-
garding the mentally ill offender, including: 
(a) all available clinical facts; 
(b) the diagnosis; 
(c) the course of treatment received at the mental health facility; 
(d) the prognosis for remission of symptoms; 
(e) potential for recidivism; 
(f) an estimation of the mentally ill offenders dangerousness either to himself or others; and 
(g) recommendations for future treatment. 
(3) Based on the report described in Subsection (2), the board may place the mentally ill offender on pa-
role. The board may require mental health treatment as a condition of parole. If treatment is ordered, failure 
to continue treatment, except by agreement with the treatment provider, and the board, is a basis for initiation 
of parole violation hearings by the board. 
(4) UDC, through Adult Probation and Parole, shall monitor the status of a mentally ill offender who has 
been placed on parole. UDC may provide treatment by contracting with the department, a local mental health 
authority, any other public or private provider, or in-house staff. 
(5) The period of parole may be no less than five years, or until expiration of the defendant's sentence, 
whichever occurs first. The board may not subsequently reduce the period of parole without considering an 
updated report on the offender's current mental condition. 
HISTORY: C. 1953, 77-16a-205, enacted by L. 1992, ch. 171, § 9. 
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Day 44 (2/25/92) 
HB418 
Representative 
Frandsen 
Efforts for the consideration. [Inaudible] Clerk. 
Clerk 
Unidentified 
Representative 
Parts of 418. Commitment and treatment of mentally ill persons in the criminal 
[ justice system by Lloyd W. Frandsen, Education 990 [inaudible] 7 absent. 
Representative Frandsen 
Representative 
Frandsen 
Thank you Mrs. Speaker and fellow representatives. Also 418 is a cooperative 
effort involving the body, different government agencies over a 6 month period 
wherein they have tried to determine what would be a good process for 
maximizing the treatment potential for mentally ill offenders. 
A number of the agencies involved include Human Services, the Department of 
Corrections, the Board of Pardons, the Psychiatric Secure Review Board. 
Incidentally, that is a Board that we are abolishing under this particular piece of 
legislation. And they are proposing to that by having the Court be given the 
authority to impose a split sentence wherein a judge can detain a mentally ill 
offender to the State hospital for treatment for up to 18 months and then modify 
sentences based on the results of the treatment. Now also, the Department of 
Corrections and the Department of Human Services can create teams of 
professionals who understand the problems of these offenders to evaluate them 
and then make recommendations as to appropriate disposition. Now we're also 
fixing a great deal of responsibility here with the Board of Pardon. 
In doing so, we are providing them with some expertise. That is they are given 
the mental health advisor to better inform them about the needs of the mentally 
ill. Now as I indicated, we are also doing, they have studied it, and this is one 
thing that's kind of exciting. We can't say the government always perpetuates 
itself forever. Here we have an example of where government has determined a 
better way to handle a problem and they are abolishing the Psychiatric Services 
Review Board. And I think that it's in the best interest of government that they 
do so. It's in the best interest of these patients who are deemed to be mentally 
ill offenders and individuals that are found not guilty by reason of insanity. 
That's an awkward group to work with. 
And so if there's any questions, I'd be happy to respond. But that's in essence 
what this bill is doing. I understand there's a lot of underlying language you 
.' will see in this bill and in essence, it makes a little complex. That is in part due 
j to the fact that a lot of the law is being repealed and being reenacted. Again, if 
j Jthere any questions JPd^beJiappy to respond. 
Unidentified ! For the discussion, Representative Adams to the bill. Representative 
Representative j LeBaron(sp??). 
Representative 
Frandsen 
With this sponsor you'll -
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Representative You will proceed? 
Unidentified 
Representative 
Representative Franson appreciates the bill that you have. But I do have - 1 
have a question. The offender that you are talking about, a mentally disabled 
as a mentally disabled person. 
Representative 
Frandsen 
That's correct. 
Unidentified 
Representative 
What kind of offenses has he created? 
Representative 
Frandsen 
Well 
J Unidentified 
j Representative 
Can he be a murderer? 
Representative 
Frandsen 
It would be a criminal offense of variety -
Unidentified 
Representative 
So he could be anything from murder to rape to child abuse to all kinds of 
things -
Representative 
Frandsen 
That's right. 
Unidentified 
Representative 
- that are bad. 
Representative 
Frandsen 
That's right. 
Unidentified 
Representative 
Representative j Yes. 
Frandsen J 
j Unidentified 
i Representative 
(Representative 
Frandsen 
• And so your bill would allow him to be sent to the state mental which is in 
I Provo? That correct? 
And hopefully they could deal with him down there. 
Unidentified 
Representative 
That's no different than the way it is currently. 
I know. And that's why I'm concerned about it. Because the Court has been 
sending some of these people, these disabled offenders as we call them now, to 
the hospital and has been sending them to the American Fort Training School. 
And these people are so dangerous. And the security of these two places is not 
adequate. We've had some mistakes and we've had some poor people being 
injured. And one of the concerns that I have in addition to that is that the point 
in their processing at this time, there's not even an outstanding conviction 
against them. They've been sent down for evaluation and training - or 
treatment. And it sounds like your bill will send some more down. We've got 
them there now, they're just being warehoused. These treatments are not being 
applied to, it is my information. And they won't be until we build a forensic 
unit which we just now have approved some planning money for to be in the 
[inaudible] security area. I am concerned how we're going to handle these. 
Can you tell me? 
Unidentified 
Representative 
[Inaudible - very, very low voice - not able to hear her at all] 
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Unidentified 
Representative 
Representative 
Frandsen 
I'm plain sick of the bill. You'll note that we are giving the directors some 
authority to have some input as to who gets admitted into the State Hospital. 
We've already had that. It doesn't work. I've sponsored a bill to get that in a 
year ago and the legal society, I don't want to name names, has gotten around 
that very easily and they're still sending them down despite that. 
All as I can indicate that it's never been as clear as what is being outlined in the 
present piece of legislation. We've really clarified that. I don't know that we 
have a perfect solution to your problem. I think that part of what you are 
talking about goes beyond the purview of this particular piece of legislation. 
While there's aspects of what your concern is that are being addressed here 
inasmuch as, for example, we are providing the Board of Pardons with 
expertise. We are fixing responsibility directly with them, giving them 
expertise to deal with mental health offenders and relying upon the staff at the 
State Hospital in connection with the corrections system to make a 
determination as to whether or not somebody ought to appropriately be housed 
at the State Hospital or in a correction facility. I think you can argue that these 
are aspects of this particular piece of legislation. And I don't know how to go 
beyond that. 
Unidentified 
Representative 
Well I will support that part of it. That doesn't bother me at all if we can help 
them. The thing that is troubling me is it sounds like this will enable more 
people of this type to be sent down to those institutions and they're not prepared 
to hold them or treat them. They're too dangerous. The faculty cannot in safety 
deal with some of these people. If we are going to send some more down there, 
it makes the problem even worse. I would rather wait a bit until we get the 
facility built where we can treat them and analyze them and do so in safety to 
those who are trying to work with them as well as to the community where they 
reside. It would make me feel better so I can vote. 
Representative 
Frandsen 
Unidentified 
Representative 
Representative 
Frandsen 
Well, the one thing that might help you solve a little better also, is that the 
Court can place - the Court has to make a determination whether they are going 
to the State Hospital or in a correction facility. If they determine that it's not 
appropriate for them to be in a State Hospital, then they can be put in a 
Correction FaciUty^ __ _ „ 
I wouldn't make it any easier for the Court to send these down -
Representative, excuse me. I have a Point of Order. Representative Howard 
state your point _ _ 
; Representative 
I Howard: 
j Representative 
! Frandsen 
j Unidentified 
j Representative 
I Representative 
'. Frandsen 
I believe we've exceed our time limit. If we wish to continue, I think we need a 
Motion to Extend for some limited amount of time. 
That would be correct Representative. 
[Inaudible], 
; See no further lights back [inaudible] Representative [inaudible] and for 
I summation. 
i 
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Unidentified j Thank you. Mr. Speaker and fellow representatives, this bill is one of those 
Representative I bills that has some high priority with the Executive Branch. It's one that we 
need to address. Bear in mind that probably 8 different agencies - government 
agencies have gotten together to determine how best to resolve this problem. It 
| is not an easy thing to deal with. I regret that the bill is not a little more simple 
j than what you would see, but I, I am very comfortable with the administrative 
| process that is being outlined in this bill. We are clarifying. We're making a 
| lot better for - easier for us to deal with these type of offenders and I think that 
I it's one that's worthy of your consideration and would ask for your support. 
[ Thank you. 
Unidentified I Boarding is now open on House Bill -
Representative 1 
^CORDING STOPS 
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